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55 
THE PRIVATIZATION OF LAW  
& THE WEAKENING OF PRIVATE RIGHT 
Jeffrey Kleeger1 
Law promises much but does not always deliver. It promises due pro-
cess, equal protection, equity, and personal autonomy—but many individu-
als leave litigation uncured. The trend in recent years has been increasing 
privatization of law coupled with diminution of private right. This paper 
explores ways to secure private rights despite privatization of law by en-
hancing the rigor of judicial review of state action. Law is one of several 
social systems operating in an environment of limited resources.2 Access to 
oil and gas is, today, more controversial, difficult, and expensive than ever 
before because of increased environmental regulations created under the 
Obama Administration.3 Those regulations are currently under review by 
President Trump and some will be reversed. The easiest to extract oil and 
gas is long gone, but because the economy depends on energy, it is essential 
that a policy in support of economic development be crafted. 
Environmental law regulations are necessary to protect the environment, 
but they do make extraction of energy resources difficult and costly. The 
privatization of law in oil and gas land use development is analyzed through 
the lens of takings. The result is public law positioned against private rights. 
The failed-now-revived Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipeline4 projects 
 
 1. Jeffrey Kleeger, Ph.D., is Program Coordinator of Legal Studies and Chair, De-
partment of Justice Studies at Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Myers, Florida. 
He is an attorney with real property transaction experience. A draft version of this 
paper was presented at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Associa-
tion in Seattle, Washington. 
 2. NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Routledge & Kegan Paul 
1972) (1985). 
 3. Coral Davenport, Obama Bans Drilling in Parts of the Atlantic and the Artic, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2016, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/us/obama-drilling-ban-arctic-
atlantic.html?_r=0. 
 4. Ashley Parker & Coral Davenport, Donald Trump’s Energy Plan: More Fossil 
Fuels and Fewer Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2016, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/us/politics/donald-trump-global-warming-energy-
poli-
cy.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FKeystone%20XL&action=click&cont
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provide useful lessons in the development of administrative and takings 
law, judicial review, delegation, and separation of powers. 
Pipeline extensions are privately owned, state-supported infrastructure 
projects. The state allows grants, tax benefits, and eminent domain assis-
tance upon request of private developers.5 In November 2015, President 
Obama halted Keystone’s quest to build an extension across the border with 
Canada. The president reasoned that supporting tar, sands, oil, and gas ex-
traction would undercut his position on climate change.6 In September 
2016, the president halted Energy Transfer Partners’ Dakota Access project7 
on similar rationale. Dakota Access is more controversial than Keystone 
because it is nearly complete, arguably threatens cultural artifacts and 
groundwater supplies, and its negative impact is imposed on a legally pro-
tected minority. 
The cost to individual private rights and environmental protection must 
be weighed against social benefits, economic development and energy secu-
rity considerations. The question is, do promised benefits justify expected 
costs? Given the decade-long record low in market price of oil and gas, 
coupled with record-high stockpiles of same, the issue of energy security is 
less a priority today than it once was. TransCanada was hopeful Keystone 
would be approved and continued to explore ways to reverse Obama’s re-
jection.8 
 Similarly, Energy Transfer struggled for approval. The Army Corps of 
Engineers approved the environmental and safety studies, rights of way and 
 
entCollec-
tion=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&content
Placement=6&pgtype=collection&_r=0; See also Associated Press, Army Corps 
holds off on resuming Dakota Access pipeline work, FOX NEWS, Oct. 10, 2016, 
available at http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/10/10/army-corps-holds-off-on-
resuming-dakota-access-pipeline-work.html. 
 5. Alejandro Dávila Fragoso, For-Profit Pipelines Are Growing and So Are Eminent 
Domain Battles, THINK PROGRESS, Jun. 7, 2016 available at 
https://thinkprogress.org/for-profit-pipelines-are-growing-and-so-are-eminent-
domain-battles-2b8beee7af3c#.yxv6vcelk.  
 6. Coral Davenport, Obama Expected to Reject Construction of Keystone XL Oil 
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2015, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/us/obama-expected-to-reject-construction-
of-keystone-xl-oil-pipeline.html?ref=topics&_r=0; See also Ian Austen, 
TransCanada Seeks $15 Billion From U.S. Over Keystone XL Pipeline, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2016, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/business/international/transcanada-to-sue-
us-for-blocking-keystone-xl-pipeline.html?_r=1. 
 7. Jeffrey Weiss, Why Were Dakota Access Pipeline Proponents So Slow To Join 
Public Debate? DALLAS NEWS, Sept. 16, 2016, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/20160916-how-the-dakota-access-
pipeline-went-from-tribal-protest-to-cause-celebre.ece. 
 8. Austen supra note 6 (indicating Obama exceeded his constitutional authority). 
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permitting were obtained, but litigation delayed construction as native 
Americans sought injunctive relief alleging the land is sacred, the pipeline 
unsafe and global warming and water supply risks abound.9 
Keystone and Dakota Access raise interesting questions about excess of 
power issues. Both offer a context to analyze current trends in land use and 
oil and gas development. Disputes involve businesses, judges and public 
officials responding to economic, emotional, political and social conflict 
over limited resources. The law cannot guarantee success in business, but it 
can provide an environment of certainty and stability necessary for effective 
planning. 
For example, land use development failures include forced displacements 
not resulting in productive developments but creating failed expectations 
and unfair deprivations. In Kelo v. City of New London,10 economic devel-
opment was held a proper justification for eminent domain and utilization a 
public use. There, a condemnation plan called for eviction of private citi-
zens from their homes to construct a commercial development promising 
jobs and economic revitalization.11 The promised public good was said to 
justify deprivation of private right. Deprivation occurred while public good 
was never realized. Once the dust settled post-eviction, the private develop-
er exited over criticism about displacements. The land was used as a munic-
ipal dump-site for yard waste—the irony being such use is the reverse use 
of a commons, which historically was for collecting fuel. Recently, New 
London officials are considering restoring the land to its original residential 
use confirming the misguided nature of the original taking.12 
Keystone is an international oil pipeline intended to promote national en-
ergy security, reduce consumer fuel prices and boost economic develop-
ment. Critics argue the benefits are exaggerated.13 Dakota Access calls for 
pipeline infrastructure to enhance its ability to bring oil from fields to refin-
eries for quicker, less costly processing. Criticism concerning Dakota Ac-
cess involves risk of global warming, that the land is environmentally sensi-
 
 9. Weiss, supra note 7; See also Associated Press, supra note 4 (courts held con-
struction appropriate despite government agency review of tribal consultation 
process); See infra note 11, (discussing claimed economic benefits and environ-
mental risks are both exaggerated). 
 10. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (eliminating blight requirement hold-
ing the state need only assert it is acting to promote some sense of public good). 
 11. Id. at 472. 
 12. Charlotte Allen, ‘Kelo’ Revisited, WEEKLY STANDARD (last visited Feb. 10, 
2014), http://www.weeklystandard.com/kelo-revisited/article/776021. 
 13. Ryan Harrigan, Comment, Transcanada’s Keystone XL Pipeline: Politics, Envi-
ronmental Harm, & Eminent Domain Abuse, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 207, 
209-210 (2012) (arguing benefits primarily accrue to Keystone, not the public 
and social burdens and risk of environmental harm are intolerable). 
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tive and is culturally sacred to Indians whose individual and social rights 
will be irreparably damaged.14 
While true, environmental protection, delegation and eminent domain 
concerns exist, and no pipeline company can absolutely guarantee absence 
of environmental and human safety risks in oil and gas development; issues 
of national energy security and economic development persist. 
Perhaps the trick of preserving while promoting is found in smart-growth 
that avoids environmental and individual damage while using science and 
technology to advantage. In the unfortunate circumstance land is damaged, 
restoration is possible; construction on Brownfields produces no new harm; 
but it would be naïve to suggest humans can maintain current lifestyles 
without negative environmental impact. Human progress cannot be in a 
risk-free environment. 
Regardless of what one believes is the best course of action with respect 
to oil and gas development and environmental protection, on 24 January 
2017, President Trump reversed Obama’s block on construction of the pipe-
lines, executed an order ending protracted environmental reviews and an-
nounced plans to ensure future pipelines in the United States (US) be con-
structed of American-made materials, permitting and regulatory approval 
requisites be minimized and expedited to promote American economic de-
velopment opportunities.15  
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATISM 
This paper is premised on interconnections between constitutional sepa-
ration of powers and the way public officials use delegated authority to ad-
vance policies promoting public good. Critics argue tools initially created to 
facilitate order and progress for public good may be used to promote private 
gain.16 The simple answer is a spillover effect occurs in any process of 
promoting public good. For example, consider a plan to take certain land 
and reallocate its use for the purpose of constructing a bridge creating social 
value and promoting economic development because it encourages com-
merce. Should such a project be halted because a private entity benefits or 
suffers loss?17 Kelo identified an unlawful pretext if the intended public 
 
 14. Weiss, supra note 7. 
 15. Peter Baker & Coral Davenport, Trump Revives Keystone Pipeline Rejected by 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2017, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/keystone-dakota-pipeline-
trump.html?_r=0. 
 16. Dana Berliner, Proceedings of the Seventh Annual New York Conference on Pri-
vate Property Rights, PROPERTY RIGHTS FOUNDATION OF AMERICA, 
https://prfamerica.org/speeches/7th/EminentDomainForPrivateGain.html (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
 17. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837). 
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purpose is in fact primarily a private gain—but it is difficult to separate 
public and private benefits. 
 The taking power was applied historically to facilitate creation of public 
goods.18 That public purpose effort is the original intended use for takings 
at the American frontier. When a taking occurs and a community benefits 
from reallocating uses to enhance development, costs result and loss and 
damage is suffered by those deprived of prior uses. The ultimate conflict is 
between the state and individuals over the degree to which personal auton-
omy is lawfully sacrificed to promote an identified public good. Historical-
ly, takings functioned to prioritize certain uses over others to encourage uti-
lization. When utility is enhanced, a logical next step is to broaden the 
range of possible uses to achieve greater social value. The only problem 
with equating utilization with public use is in deciding where to draw the 
line between private sacrifice and public good. This is particularly so if the 
state seems more interested in promoting corporate rather than social wel-
fare.19 The issue is—what are appropriate restrictions on private rights when 
the state promotes public good? The calculus of negligence is applicable in 
this. 
That question resonates in the thesis of this paper. The toolbox used by 
the state to encourage social welfare improvement includes devices such as 
police and regulatory power, takings and taxing and spending power. These 
powers are all exercised in the context of separation of powers. The trend 
toward privatization of law is expressed in the delegation process where 
private gain sometimes results. One significant characteristic state powers 
have in common is each may be used to promote public good at the expense 
of personal autonomy. 
How much burden on a few individuals is worth how much public good? 
Can the damage imposed be justified by the good produced? All persons are 
included in the idea of what is public and all benefit from enhanced public 
good; yet a select few bear disproportionate burden, loss and sacrifice for 
the benefit of all. For example, all Americans derive generalized benefit 
from the Dakota Access extension producing enhanced energy security; but 
the Standing Rock Sioux tribe alleges it will suffer irreparable harm. In 
more recent years, the trend observed by researchers in land use law, indi-
cates a weakening of owner-rights.20 In India for example, land ownership 
 
 18. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 1 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1977, 1992). 
 19. John K. Murphy, Constitutional Corporatism: The Public Use Clause as a Means 
of Corporate Welfare, 2 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 91, 91-92 (2013) (government 
using eminent domain for public goods and the expansion of the meaning of 
“public use”). 
 20. Jaivir Singh, Separation of Powers and the Erosion of the “Right to Property” in 
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is no longer a fundamental constitutional right.21 Instead, it is reduced to 
easement-like license to use.22 In the US, ownership can be abridged by the 
state to promote public good. This trend away from protecting private rights 
signifies private land is now more easily burdened, limited or cut short by 
the rule of law in the name of supporting social welfare good. 
Environmental protection regulates development benefiting the public by 
promoting preservation, yet this approach restricts individual owner-
freedom to profit from ownership. The important takeaway is whether state 
authority to interfere with ownership is sufficiently restrained. The public 
perception is individual rights are subordinate to state authority and private 
ownership must yield to public interest. For example, as Dakota construc-
tion is delayed, the company is deprived of its expectation of transport cost 
savings and suffers loss.23 
Across the globe, the trend toward privatization is noticeable with the 
beneficiary being corporate interests. Law’s role in society is promoting or-
der and progress and protecting individual rights against state encroach-
ment.24 Does halting a pipeline construction plan benefit the public and 
promote order and progress or harm individuals? The question is complex 
because circumstance impacts designation of value and “who” the “individ-
ual” is shifts, based on perspective. For example, is the Indian tribe seeking 
to stop the pipeline the impacted “individuals” or are they a subset of the 
public? Is protecting “individuals” justifiable if the result harms to the pub-
lic? How much harm and to whom, is sufficient to justify state action? 
When the state exercises power to promote public good, it operates 
through delegation. Public officials are delegated authority to act on behalf 
of the state and are charged with protecting private rights. Proper use of 
delegated authority is critically important and improper use unlawful. Pres-
ently, it is increasingly easier to encroach on private rights to promote pub-
lic good. State-created institutions are concentric agents of the state, as are 
public officials. The two are philosophically congruent and subordinate pri-
vate rights. The foundational unit of analysis is the individual case con-
ceived of in the relationship between private rights and state power.25  
 
India, 17 CONST. POL. ECON. 303, 312 [hereinafter Singh, Separation of Powers]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. THE CONST. OF INDIA, art. 31(2). 
 23. Meenal Vamburkar, Dakota Pipeline Protests Rise on Hope Project is ‘Keystone-
ed’, BLOOMBERG MARKET (Mar. 3, 2017, 5:35 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-15/dakota-pipeline-protests-
rise-on-hope-project-is-keystone-ed.  
 24. Singh, Separation of Powers, supra note 20 at 314. 
 25. Jaivir Singh, (Un)Constituting Property: The Destruction of the “Right to Prop-
erty” in India, WORKING PAPER SERIES, August 2004, available at 
http://www.jnu.ac.in/CSLG/workingPaper/05-
Un%20Constituting%20(Jaivir%20Singh).pdf [hereinafter Singh, 
 
9 FIFTH ARTICLE - JEFFREY KLEEGER TEMPLATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)  4/12/17  12:03 PM 
2016 The Privatization of Law 61 
 
That law is increasingly privatized is evidenced by the rise in use of tak-
ings power to promote economic development.26 Simultaneously, the need 
to justify state takings by claiming a substantial public good is less urgent 
or necessary. As the public is more willing to accept corporatism as a natu-
ral pathway toward progress, sacrifice of democratic processes is less diffi-
cult to achieve—corporatism is marked by sacrifice, abrogation and avoid-
ance of consensus in the interest of efficiency.27 The most recent example of 
this is how Dakota Access28 and Keystone29 appear on track to be approved. 
President Trump’s election victory is a symbol of capital accumulation pre-
vailing over environmental sensitivity. The final defense against approval is 
the media claim the projects are more corporate than social-welfare orient-
ed.30 
Keystone was litigated in Thompson v. Heineman.31 There, issues of del-
egation, due process, equal protection and separation of powers were under-
lying themes. The dynamic of takings law presents a backdrop for con-
trasting the promise of law (which is divine), and its irreverent pathos. 
While the state is duty-bound to apply the law to safeguard owner-rights, 
the law falls short when tolerating interference with those rights. The con-
stitution provides guidance to public officials with respect to how to exe-
cute their duty of governance, guarantees certain rights to individuals and is 
widely considered the highest source of law;32 yet its function to prescribe 
powers and restrict officials from excessive action does not always secure 
rights.33 
The separation of powers concept is a response to concentrated power 
and risk of excess. The more dispersed organization of layers in the former 
is intended to resolve the perception of abuse arising in unilateral concen-
tration of authority necessary to achieve results. Executive and legislative 
powers are intentionally diffused in competing units to check and balance 
authority. Concentrating and separating power enhances equity, facilitates 
functionality and better protects. 
 
(Un)Constituting Property]. 
 26. Murphy, supra note 19. 
 27. Id. at 91. 
 28. Dave Kolpack, Court halts construction of another Dakota Access oil pipeline 
section, NORTHWEST HERALD, (Mar. 16, 2017, 8:34 PM), 
http://m.nwherald.com/2016/09/18/court-halts-construction-of-another-dakota-
access-oil-pipeline-section/at6f0jk/.  
 29. Ryan Harrigan, Transcanada’s Keystone XL Pipeline: Politics, Environmental 
Harm, & Eminent Domain Abuse, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 207 (2012). 
 30. Murphy, supra note 19. 
 31. Thompson v. Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015). 
 32. Singh, Separation of Powers, supra note 20 at 314. 
 33. Singh, (Un)Constituting Property, supra note 25 at 1-2. 
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Ultimately, the fate of the pipeline extensions are political questions. 
With Keystone, the Nebraska State Supreme Court did not prohibit con-
struction—its decision, a bit complex due to Nebraska’s unique political 
structure, seemingly approved construction.34 With Dakota Access, federal 
courts have repeatedly ruled construction may proceed. It was federal exec-
utive rejection that blocked construction in both cases. Just weeks after 
President Obama formally denied permit approval to TransCanada, state 
regulators in South Dakota approved the contested section of the pipeline.35 
These conflicts raise questions about the proper scope of state interference 
with private rights, the appropriate balance in separation of powers and 
what form and scope of delegation is proper.36 
II. THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC LAW ON PRIVATE RIGHTS 
Some theorists view compulsory acquisition as a measured, conservative 
use of political power, legitimately applied to encourage economic devel-
opment by more efficiently allocating resources making it an effective tool 
to promote public good.37 Law is a servant of the state, a means to an end, a 
social construct and by-product of blending economic theory with practice 
subject to political and social pressure to promote beneficial reform.38 But 
law is also something more—it is the essence of balancing safety and free-
dom that represents the means to preserve and promote individuality.39 
Transformation in law—meaning modification intended to address social 
problems, presents popular agreements about formal social response to con-
flict.40 
The Nebraska Supreme Court was faced with crisis when called upon to 
decide Keystone. Conflicting demands of economic need, individual rights, 
political and social pressure operated to move the governor and legislature 
to collaboratively promote a joint venture, public-private partnership in the 
pipeline.41 The infrastructure improvement plan required a few private citi-
zens be forced to suffer restrictions on ownership to facilitate public good.42 
 
 34. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 766. 
 35. Associated Press, South Dakota: Keystone XL Pipeline Permit Renewed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/us/south-
dakota-keystone-xl-pipeline-permit-renewed.html. 
 36. Id. 
 37. HORWITZ, supra note 18. 
 38. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF 
LAW 6-7 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006, 2007). 
 39. HORWITZ, supra note 18. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 740. 
 42. The claimed benefits of new jobs, lower consumer prices, economic development 
gains and promoting national energy security are criticized in the literature as il-
lusory; See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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The plan was proposed a decade ago, at a time when the economy was suf-
fering, the market price of oil and gas were at all time-highs, energy securi-
ty appeared at risk due to volatility in the Middle East, and there was no end 
in sight to the economic, political and social uncertainty created by the war 
on terror.43 It appeared crisis justified state interference with and restriction 
on private rights.44 Public officials acted to address the crisis.45 The pipeline 
extension was part of that effort.46 
Effective land use management requires consensus among interested par-
ties, or a court order mandating reform.47 The legal system is in place to 
provide a means for dispute resolution. Law is a tool, and means to the end, 
of achieving stability and prosperity in economic and social relations 
through use of logic and neutrality.48 However, when inconsistent objec-
tives arise—such as protecting private property and the environment, or 
promoting alternative land uses to encourage economic development and 
promote national security; certain interests must yield to others and harm or 
sacrifice be suffered to effectuate more efficient allocation of resources.49 
This is the meaning of utilization as public use—a concept holding en-
hanced utilization is automatically public good.50 The idea is consistent 
with the notion of yielding private rights to public good. The traditional ex-
ample is taking private property to construct a public hospital, road, school 
or utility. The role of law is to manage the transaction to force a desired re-
allocation of uses the market fails to achieve, to secure social good.51 The 
law and economics literature justifies takings as economic reordering to 
solve social problems. Thus, intrusive state action is excused making it ap-
pear the objective is serving public good.52 Korematsu v. US53 held national 
security is public use and Kelo extended the concept to economic develop-
ment.54  
In Keystone, the judiciary was called upon to resolve a conflict between 
private property rights and public good.55 The lower court ruled plaintiff-
 
 43. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 740. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. TAMANAHA, supra note 38 at 6-7. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Kelo, 545 U.S; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 50. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214. 
 51. Singh, Separation of Powers, supra note 20 at 304. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24. 
 54. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 486-89. 
 55. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 739-40. 
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owners established taxpayer standing, were legitimately aggrieved by pipe-
line approval56and the complained of state action was an unlawful delega-
tion of authority to the executive.57 On appeal, although the state Supreme 
Court agreed with the lower court ruling, it nevertheless condoned construc-
tion by not invalidating the statute in question.58 So the issue remains, did 
the legislature properly authorize the pipeline?59 The court did not address 
the merits of the case,60 reinforcing Rosenberg’s Hollow Hope thesis.61 
The primary purpose of taking private property is promoting public 
good. There is an implicit obligation on the part of the state to protect indi-
vidual personal autonomy and limit takings by a standard of necessity.62 
The question is whether that standard was satisfied. The precipitous drop in 
oil and gas prices weakened the energy security justification for the pipe-
line, emboldening Obama to reject the extension in favor of environmental 
concerns.63 The claim of risk of environmental degradation can never be en-
tirely eliminated in oil and gas development.64 
Thompson is a curious decision—four of seven judges agreed the statute 
was unconstitutional; but the merits were not reached. The legal issues 
raised in Thompson include a claim the statute inappropriately transferred 
constitutionally-granted authority of regulating common carriers from the 
state Public Service Commission (NSPSC) to the governor, and that the 
statute unlawfully authorized the governor to transfer legislative eminent 
domain power to a private entity.65 
Courts typically dispose of cases on technical bases if possible as a mat-
 
 56. Id. 
 57. The legislature was criticized for transferring route-setting power to the governor 
and takings power to Keystone. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 736. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Kathleen Miller, The Fifth Judge: Thompson v. Heineman and Nebraska’s Judi-
cial Supermajority Clause, NEB. L. REV. BULL. (June, 2015). 
 60. Id. (citing Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 739-40.); see NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2. 
 61. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991) (claiming courts do not possess the 
tools necessary to effectuate meaningful social change). 
 62. The Takings Clause declares a taking must be for a public purpose and just com-
pensation must be paid to those deprived of ownership rights; it is assumed offi-
cials only act upon necessity. 
 63. Coral Davenport, Citing Climate Change, Obama Rejects Construction of 
Keystone XL Oil Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/us/obama-expected-to-reject-construction-
of-keystone-xl-oil-pipeline.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Davenport, Obama Rejects 
Keystone Pipeline]. 
 64. Noah Greenwald, America’s Disastrous History of Pipeline Accidents Shows Why the 
Keystone Vote Matters, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 18, 2014, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/noah-greenwald/pipeline-accidents_b_6174082.html. 
 65. Miller, supra note 59 at 845 (citing Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 736). 
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ter of judicial efficiency. In Thompson, three judges declined to consider the 
merits holding plaintiffs lacked standing.66 When private rights are not fair-
ly protected, individual liberty suffers and uncertainty results. Economic 
and social prosperity depend on certainty and stability in relations of pro-
duction, supported by law. Parties demand confidence agreements will be 
enforced.67 In the context of ensuring appropriate balance between protect-
ing private rights and promoting public good, the scope of judicial review is 
significant.68 In Thompson, effectively there was none. 
An alternative approach is situationally determining the need for en-
hanced, more robust review. When a complete administrative record is cre-
ated and public officials act transparently following proper procedure, then 
courts are justified in extending greater deference to decisions reached by 
such officials.69 The opposite result is appropriate should there be a less 
substantively developed record or failure to adhere to proper procedure. 
Moreover, political considerations are relevant. While benefit to a private 
interest is not unlawful per se, there is a sense promoting private advantage 
raises conflict of interest concerns. Promoting public good must be the pri-
mary purpose of state action and if a private party primarily benefits, that 
could be unlawful pretext.70 
Some theorists argue concentrations of power damage individual rights, 
but separation of powers corrects it.71 There are benefits and costs associat-
ed with takings. Benefits include creation of positive results when public 
officials engineer a certain economic, political and social climate conducive 
to promoting public good; and costs include unintended consequences of 
negative interference with personal autonomy by way of expropriation.72 
Other costs include risk of misallocating resources and diminished public 
good.73 The law on takings is increasingly privatized in recent years by ac-
tivist officials promoting public-private partnerships using takings.74 This 
privatization trend by public authority is enhanced by judicial deference to 
policy decisions. Understanding the scope and boundary of proper delega-
tion elucidates the privatization of law trend. 
 
 66. Id. at 859. 
 67. NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (Oxford Univ. Press, 1993, 2004). 
 68. Singh, Separation of Powers, supra note 20 at 304. 
 69. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 736. 
 70. See Kelo, 545 US 469 (2005). 
 71. Singh, Separation of Powers, supra note 20 at 314-315. 
 72. Id. at 305. 
 73. Id. at 316. 
 74. See generally Miller, supra note 59. 
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III. THE PROPER BOUNDARY OF DELEGATION 
 The lower court in Thompson ruled the legislation authorizing the gover-
nor to approve the pipeline route was unlawful delegation of regulatory au-
thority and intrusion upon prior-granted constitutional powers.75 The Court 
reached that result because authority to regulate common carriers in Ne-
braska was placed firmly in the hands of an independent, constitutionally-
established commission. The court held the legislature lacked authority to 
delegate a regulatory power it did not possess.76 
There exists a lawful and rational place in governance for delegation to 
enable the state to minimize transaction costs incurred in policy-
implementation. This is the reason public-private partnerships are so attrac-
tive. While it is incumbent upon public officials not to delegate their power 
of policy making, the rationale supporting delegation is the value in mini-
mizing the cost of governance and maximizing efficiency granting experts 
discretion to act consistent with policy.77 The relationship between public-
private partnerships, economic development and rule of law establishes a 
baseline for determining whether delegations are lawful. 
Government entities have long struggled with how to provide services to 
better satisfy fiduciary duties and public purpose objectives. One approach 
is to form public-private partnerships by which public and private sector en-
tities associate, share skills, assets, risks and rewards in joint-venture.78 
Typically such partnerships are a vehicle by which the parties explore 
means to more effectively achieve desired results. Good government wel-
comes private participation for the knowledge, skills and capital investment 
resources contributed by the private sector; and private enterprise welcomes 
the stability, tax and permit benefits and more secure return on investment 
made possible by partnering with the state. Such partnerships are enabled 
and constrained by the degree of accountability respected in the relation-
ship.79 
The downside to infrastructure development joint-venture planning is 
land must be assembled to implement improvements and individuals must 
be displaced of possessory interests to assemble the needed land. Assem-
 
 75. See Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 736. 
 76. A reasonable interpretation of separation of powers suggests the legislature could 
lawfully restrict the commission’s jurisdiction over common carriers. 
 77. Singh, (Un)Constituting Property, supra note 25 at 3-4. 
 78. Scott Walchak, Remarks at the University of Baltimore School of Law Journal of 
Land & Development Symposium: Public-Private Partnerships: A Vehicle for 
Economic Development and Promotion of the Rule of Law (April 9 2015), in 4 
U. BALT. LAW  J. LAND & DEV. Vol. 4, Iss. 2, Article 2, 105, 109 (edited tran-
script available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjld / vol4/iss2/2. 
 79. Id at 111. 
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blage of large tracts almost always impacts a number private owners.80 Del-
egation is often discussed in terms of legislative power, although delegation 
commonly occurs at every level and form of government. The concept of 
non-delegation refers to the illegitimacy of a grant of express authority to 
make policy decisions.81 
The takings clause authorizes the state to take private property to pro-
mote public use; it does not authorize the state to delegate takings power to 
private parties or condone takings for private use.82 Although delegation is 
permissible to improve public service by facilitating the ability of public of-
ficials to accomplish assigned tasks more quickly and cost-effectively, al-
lowing experts to exercise discretion to resolve ambiguity83 in the execution 
of lawfully assigned duties; there are certain boundaries beyond which del-
egation ceases to be lawful. 
A party with proper authority to act in a given field may legitimately del-
egate certain tasks, so long as proper direction is provided to the recipient. 
Grants of authority permitting a substitute to act under a given set of cir-
cumstances is not the equivalent of abdication of authority. It logically fol-
lows, a party to whom delegated authority is conferred may lawfully sub-
delegate to others to perform certain tasks, so long as all proper direction is 
provided.84 It is useful to view the separation of powers concept in terms of 
delegation because separation of powers mandates certain authority cannot 
be delegated to a designee whose jurisdiction is too distinct from the loca-
tion within which the power to act originates. Interactions across various 
branches85 are better understood as compromise aimed toward reaching 
consensus about how best to resolve a social problem86 and promote public 
good. 
Costs incurred in delegations are minimized by unifying tasks to maxim-
ize efficiency and achieve synergy.87 Similarly, it is possible to view private 
 
 80. Singh, Separation of Powers, supra note 20 at 305, 315-316 (such property rights 
include the power to acquire, hold, dispose of or exclude others from use). 
 81. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. 
CT. REV. 201, 201 (2001). 
 82. Edward J. Sullivan, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE, available at 
http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/articles/brief_hx_taking.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 
2017). 
 83. Barron & Kagan, supra note 81. 
 84. Id. (presenting a thesis that review of delegation should focus on the recipient of 
the authority (the delegate) and her responsibility for decision-making as opposed 
to the form of delegation granted in terms of its generality or specificity or 
whether the procedure is formal or informal). 
 85. Singh, Separation of Powers, supra note 20 at 316. 
 86. Singh, (Un)Constituting Property, supra note 25 at 6. 
 87. Id. at 6. 
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property rights in the context of an interplay between positive efforts by the 
state to engineer certain economic, political and social configurations to 
promote public good; while acknowledging the risk of negative violations 
of private rights that can be highly damaging to personal autonomy.88 
Nebraska’s unique form of government structure, its unicameral legisla-
ture and super majority rule in the judiciary89 caused a different result than 
what might otherwise have been expected in Keystone’s application pro-
cess. Nebraska has a history of stacking the odds in favor of citizens’ rights, 
for example by creating an independent regulatory entity charged with ap-
proving common carrier rates and routes, the state sought to ensure the ab-
sence of conflict of interest.90 Nebraska’s unicameral legislative form, cou-
pled with its supermajority judicial requirement for overturning legislative 
acts, appears to favor citizens91 and cost effectiveness along with repre-
sentative government. The purpose motivating these unique approaches 
were to save money, time to get legislation enacted and to avoid corruption, 
all for the public good.92 
It should come as no surprise then that in its legislative enactment, Ne-
braska statutorily developed its own separation of powers framework.93 The 
transfer of power attempted by the legislature was a delegation to the execu-
tive of specific authority to achieve a particular result intended to benefit 
the public. Such special interest legislation, however, is inherently suspi-
cious, and by most accounts, unlawful.94 In this case it illegitimately be-
stowed legislative takings power on a private entity via transfer from the 
legislature to the governor to Keystone. It is interesting the supermajority 
requirement intended to support representative government and minimize 
the risk of judicial activism prevented the court from overturning the stat-
 
 88. Id. at 7.  
 89. Miller, supra note 59 at 4. 
 90. Id. 
 91. NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 20. The Public Service Commission was created in 1885 
by the Legislature to regulate railroads. A constitutional amendment to establish 
the commission was ratified in 1906. The Commission holds broad oversight and 
administrative powers over telecommunications, natural gas and oil pipelines, 
utilities and is charged with determining policy on communications and public 
service. See Brief History of the Commission, NEB. PUB. SERV. COMM’N., 
http://www.psc.nebraska.gov/admin/history.html (last visited April 6, 2017). 
 92. See NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 20 
 93. Legis. B. 1161, 102nd Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Neb 2012). This law shifted power 
to the executive and took oversight away from the independent administrative 
agency tasked with regulating oil and gas utilities. 
 94. See generally Chris Edwards, Special-Interest Spending, CATO INST. (April 
2009), 
https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/sites/downsizinggovernment.org/files/pd
f/special-interest-spending.pdf (detailing the dominance of special interests in 
government subsidies). 
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ute, because if the governor and legislature were indeed complicit in uncon-
stitutionally by-passing an authorized agency’s authority, then the delega-
tion was in fact unlawful and the better legal result is voiding the law. 
The Nebraska State Supreme Court, by constitutional fiat,95 may only 
strike a legislative act with supermajority approval—three of seven judges 
holding the case was not properly before them prevented that. Although 
four judges agreed to address the merits, their conclusion the statutory dele-
gation was unlawful was not binding or precedential. One way of making 
sense of the result is to recognize Thompson as a case decided upon a pro-
cedural technicality.96 An alternative view is to conclude law is a tool of the 
state and is typically used to facilitate capital accumulation. If this latter 
view is accepted, it demonstrates the privatization of law thesis that the 
state is indeed transformed into capital, and law is increasingly privatized. 
IV. THE LAWFUL SCOPE OF DELEGATION 
 The lawful scope of delegation is viewed from an internal rather than ex-
ternal perspective. Delegation is a challenge to the separation of powers re-
gime—it blends the functions and powers of distinct branches of govern-
ment and blurs practical distinctions. Concentrating the powers of separate 
branches in one unit or single source is problematic—it increases the possi-
bility of abuse by rogue delegates whose intention is self and other-serving. 
Courts have long grappled with this problem without finding a satisfactory 
solution. Critics complain the rigor of judicial review is insufficient to meet 
this challenge, and courts tend to review acts of sister branches with too 
great a presumption of validity.97 The continuum of appropriate discretion 
is situational. Excessive delegation, meaning dispensation of authority that 
goes beyond the proper boundary minimally necessary to achieve sufficient 
effect, amounts to abdication of responsibility by the grantor.  
The lawful scope of delegation was worked out in a number of US Su-
preme Court decisions, but remains subjective in its application. The basic 
premise is no body or government can effectively complete all the work it is 
tasked with, and so it is left without recourse to outsource some of its re-
sponsibility to act, along with the minimally proper measure of requisite au-
thority necessary to those better suited, placed, trained or in possession of 
required resources to more effectively perform and achieve results.98 
 
 95. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 (declaring no legislative act shall be held unconstitutional 
except by concurrence of no less than five state supreme court judges). 
 96. See Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798 (2015). 
 97. Barron & Kagan, supra note 81. 
 98. Efficiencies of scale, expertise, proximity and resource-accessibility are measures 
of success. 
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The legal system recognizes the necessity and sufficiency of certain del-
egations, but also maintains some are inappropriate, because the scope or 
boundary of appropriate dispensation is exceeded. This can happen, for ex-
ample, if a branch or unit attempts to delegate authority to another when it 
ought not to have, as when the intended delegate is incompetent to receive 
the power conferred,99 or the delegator does not possess the full measure of 
authority it is attempting to grant. An example of a proper delegation that 
enhances effectiveness is a Congressional grant of tax enforcement authori-
ty to officials in the Internal Revenue Service to act as an agent for revenue 
collection. Proper delegations occur at all levels of government, across all 
branches and sub-delegations may in certain circumstances be entirely ap-
propriate.100 
Factors a reviewing court may consider in deciding whether a delegation 
is proper include the degree of authority assigned—whether the authority to 
implement a certain policy is a proper subject of delegation; but the task of 
formulating policy is not properly delegable. Moreover, the grantor must 
publically declare the policy intended and fix the legal principles that con-
trol in given instances providing clear and intelligible direction to guide the 
delegate in action.101 If a standard is established and intelligible guiding 
principle adequately stated, the delegation is lawful.102 
Sufficiency is by no means universally apparent. Generally, a delegation 
must be necessary, and the scope of authority assigned as minimal as possi-
ble to accomplish the task. The validity of a delegation depends on the rigor 
of judicial review—when review is at low-levels, a delegation is more read-
ily acceptable in terms of meeting minimum thresholds of necessity and 
sufficiency. Such determinations of legitimacy depend on how interpretive 
decisions are made with regard to the application of authority, whether the 
scope of authority granted is unnecessarily or unlawfully excessive and the 
degree of deference a reviewing court will apply in its examination and de-
termination of the record provided by the delegate.103 
The separation of powers holds it a breach of constitutional law for a 
delegator to fully release the absolute extent of her constitutionally-granted 
power or to blindly transfer his entire authority in a given field to anoth-
er.104 Nevertheless, a delegation is lawful, even where considerable discre-
 
 99. In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 v. The Part C States (Laws) Act 1950, 1951 AIR 
332, 1951 SCR 747 (1951). 
 100. Barron & Kagan, supra note 81 at 201 (indicating a sub-delegation is appropriate 
if it better effectuates the original delegation). 
 101. In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912. 
 102. Id. (noting that delegations must be necessary and minimally sufficient to achieve 
the intended results). 
 103. Barron & Kagan, supra note 81 at 201-202. 
 104. See J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
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tion is conferred, when such discretion is characterized as ministerial and 
falls neatly within an established policy.105 For example, the Court in 
Hampton explained the critical distinction for recognizing legitimacy of a 
delegation is in the difference between delegation of power to make law 
(incorporating discretion to determine what the law shall be) and conferring 
authority to execute the law within lawful guidelines (recognizing the ne-
cessity of strict adherence to procedural requirements).106 This means dele-
gation is capable of merging separate powers into a unitary authority in 
contradiction to the premise of separation of powers. 
 The rationale for delegating authority is no entity can effectively man-
age all aspects of its responsibility without assistance. As a result, and in the 
interest of promoting efficiency, legislatures often delegate certain elements 
of authority to those better suited to act. Such delegations are lawful so long 
as broad general directives and limits on authority granted are established in 
advance, are public and the grantor retains the bulk of its original powers.107  
In Hampton it was observed one branch must not relinquish or transfer 
its power to another or attempt to invest itself of the power of another.108 
Field v. Clark109 holds the executive cannot be invested with the power to 
make law and if the legislature clearly sets forth standards adequate to guide 
the executive in its application of conferred authority, the executive may 
exercise limited discretion in executing the task.110 Indeed, the exercise of 
delegated power requires some interpretation by the delegate as to how to 
go about completing the task. 
A delegation of authority is a deed of trust—the delegate must take re-
sponsibility and remain accountable to the exercise of authority.111 The 
Court in Field explained the basic foundation for understanding the scope 
of a proper delegation is between the use of power to make law, which in-
volves discretion as to what the law shall be (substance); and the use of 
power in the execution of the law which involves discretion as to what ap-
propriate steps to take (process)—and more importantly, that the former is 
not deemed the equivalent of the latter.112  
 
 105. In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912. 
 106. See generally J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 394. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 110. Id. (discussing the premise a delegate may use discretion to properly execute a 
task on behalf of a grantor but may not assume the complete authority belonging 
to the grantor). 
 111. Barron & Kagan, supra note 81 at 201-02, (describing a proposed approach to 
determine the appropriateness of a delegation of considering the identity of the 
delegate-decision-maker and degree of responsibility assumed). 
 112. Field, 143 U.S. at 695.  
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In Field the Court held the legislature cannot, without limits attached, 
delegate its power to make law; yet the legislature can make a law under the 
premise that certain acts may require reasonable, interpretive discretion in 
their execution, permitting a grantee of authority to make wise and careful 
inquiry into the facts and circumstances in a set of unknown variables and 
therein apply her judgment to ensure logical, responsible and justifiable re-
sults are achieved.113 The legislature may broadly enact all the laws it 
deems necessary and proper to effectuate its enumerated powers, such as 
the power to tax, spend, take and otherwise safeguard and promote public 
good.114 As applied pipeline permit approval, for example, the Nebraska 
Legislature is empowered to establish a commission or agency for the pur-
pose of setting rate and route regulations consistent with a general policy 
standard that utility or common carriers operate fairly, without discrimina-
tion and for the purpose of benefitting the public; although some allowance 
for corporate profit is recognized as acceptable, as held in Smyth v. Ames.115  
If the above is generally accepted as a permitted norm in government 
functionality, what makes Thompson noteworthy and why is the legislature 
deemed to have exceeded its authority? The answer lies in making sense of 
differing conclusions about how delegated authority should be exercised in 
the context of separation of powers because it is the legislative branch that 
determines what the law shall be. As long as constitutional principles and 
restrictions on exercise of government power are satisfied, a delegation 
permitting deprivation of private right is, all else being equal, legally ac-
ceptable.116 Despite the distinctions described above, the legislature cannot 
delegate its purely legislative function to any other branch—what the legis-
lature can do is delegate certain powers to establish general rules of action 
and may turn over to its grantee certain discretion with respect to the execu-
tion thereof; but only so long as the delegated powers are not all-inclusive 
and limits on authority are clearly defined.117 
Consistent with the above, a lawful delegation must offer precise stand-
ards as to scope of authority in regulated subject matter. Furthermore, there 
must be safeguards such that the public is properly protected against possi-
bility of abuse of delegated authority by limiting the scope of discretion, 
which goes to the heart of interpretive authority.118  
 
 113. Id. at 685. 
 114. Id. at 695-96. 
 115. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 523-25 (1898), overruled by Fed. Power Comm’n 
v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575 (1942). 
 116. Id. at 523-25. 
 117. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 409-10 (holding the intelligible principle 
holds delegation lawful if coupled with a clear and common-sense directive about 
how the grantee may act). 
 118. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
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Finally, it is important to observe acts that take effect upon a contingency 
are not the making of law. Rather, such acts constitute execution of prior-
made law.119 Thus, delegations are lawful when the legislature provides a 
grantee with a clear understanding of what is to be accomplished and a gen-
eral sense of how to do it. The structure of the grant must be immersed 
within the “intelligible principle standard”—which is to say the delegate 
must act with common sense in the context of the situation.120 With respect 
to the Nebraska delegation, the question is whether the legislature properly 
followed rules concerning how to effectuate a lawful delegation. 
V. THE NON-DELEGATION PRINCIPLE 
 Chevron USA Inc., v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,121 began 
an intellectual conversation about what the boundaries of judicial deference 
ought to look like. The discussion began in the context of administrative 
law which is the appropriate language to use to regulate delegations. The 
rule of deference introduced in Chevron is quite high as only those delega-
tions viewed as excessively overbroad are ever invalidated by courts.122 So 
what does an over-broad delegation actually look like? It is one that pro-
vides the delegate with little or no guidance in application of discretion, and 
requires no preliminary findings of necessity to justify authorizing a broad, 
generalized authority to act.123 This does not mean specificity as to the 
scope of action to be taken by a delegate is absolutely necessary; but it does 
mean a delegate may not possess absolute, unlimited discretion to act in a 
field that falls within the jurisdiction of another branch. The test for lawful-
ness is whether the grant declares a policy, establishes a standard and lays 
down a clear, comprehensive rule of law.124 
The power to delegate, while broad, has been increasingly constrained in 
 
(1984). 
 119. Id. at 862. 
 120. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 409. 
 121. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 865-66. 
 122. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418-19 (1935); see also A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 525-26 (1935) (con-
demning involvement of private trade groups in the creation of binding codes of 
competition in conjunction with government agencies because the statute lacked 
adequate guiding standards). 
 123. In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, (noting the proposition Congress may not abdi-
cate its duty or transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it 
is vested, but also observing Congress may establish policies and standards and 
thereon delegate to others a task and sufficient discretion to make subordinate 
rules within prescribed limits as thought necessary to implement a law or policy 
of the legislature) (citing Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 421).   
 124. Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 415. 
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recent years.125 Chevron describes a two-step inquiry for judicial review in 
the context of an agency’s interpretation of a statute granting authority to 
act.126 The first question is whether the legislature spoke directly with re-
spect to a precise issue—if so, the agency must comply with the directive; 
the second question, reached only if the legislature has not directly spoken 
with respect to a precise issue, is whether the agency applied a reasonable 
interpretation of the charge with which it was tasked127 in the context of the 
grant of authority. 
The Court has since walked back the idea of substantial deference clari-
fying a presumption of legitimacy for acts that are the product of formal ad-
judication, notice and comment rule-making; but not for acts resulting from 
less formally developed opinion letters, policy statements, manuals and 
guidelines, indicating the latter are informal resolutions lacking procedural 
safeguards.128 Delegations are thus lawful if a legislature sufficiently details 
the scope of a delegated action, and the delegate acts with formality in exer-
cising the authority granted.  
The takeaway from this is courts defer to the legitimacy of a delegation 
unless the legislature does not speak directly to the precise issue at hand, or 
the official upon whom power to act is conferred, acts informally. In such 
cases, judicial review must be more rigorous. An unresolved question con-
cerns what government branch—the executive, (in exercising discretion), or 
the judiciary, (in reviewing executive action), has greater interpretive au-
thority.129 
In United States v. Mead Corporation130 the Court held interpretive rules 
issued by the Customs agency were not entitled to Chevron deference be-
cause tariff decisions are informal adjudications, not-uniform and carry no 
precedential value or force of law. While formal, generalized expressions of 
decision-making utilizing notice and comment rulemaking are afforded 
greater deference than informal adjudications, (the former provide assur-
ance of accountability and good temperament in decision-making); it may 
be better to apply a case-by-case inquiry in deciding whether deference is 
proper, (despite the consequent sacrifice of flexibility).131 Factors to consid-
er include whether a delegation was intended to promote a clearly described 
policy granting authority to act to a specific delegate and whether there is a 
 
 125. Barron & Kagan, supra note 81 at 202, 206-212. 
 126. Id. at 206. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 208 (describing how a lack of procedural formality can equate to a lack of 
force of law which would require greater rigor and less deference of judicial re-
view in terms of both substance and process). 
 129. Id. at 202. 
 130. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 131. Barron & Kagan, supra note 81 at 225. 
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sufficiently specific directive as to scope and boundary of authority grant-
ed.132 Legislative delegations to private entities are never lawful.133 Courts 
will not issue policy decisions, but when formal procedures are used, courts 
validate a delegate’s reasonable resolution of ambiguity.134 
The non-delegation doctrine is an interpretive construct of constitutional 
law. It is a product of causal interactions of separation of powers requisites 
and due process constraints.135 A rigid interpretation of separation of pow-
ers requisites bars executive and administrative officials from investing 
themselves with power to make law, leaving them only with authority to 
construe and execute law. It is important to note there are circumstances 
that lend themselves to permit delegation to those better placed to address 
certain problems and therefore a more flexible application of separation of 
powers, consistent with the rules set forth here, describing a proper delega-
tion, is a more practical approach compared to a rigid regime of pure sepa-
ration of powers.136 If the law as applied turns out not to be as useful to so-
ciety as originally intended, then society will be challenged to create 
 
 132. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825) (holding judicial determination of 
rules of procedure is a legislative function lawfully delegated to courts leaving 
the judicial delegate with power to “fill up the details”); Field, 143 U.S. at 700 
(holding legislature may delegate tariff-setting authority to executive to act as its 
agent); Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at  432 (holding legislature may delegate 
power to prohibit interstate shipment of oil products in excess of certain quotas to 
executive to act as its agent, but the law enacted is void because it offered insuffi-
cient direction as to implementation of delegation); A.L.A Schechter Poultry 
Corp., 295 U.S. at 550-51 (holding legislature may delegate power to approve 
trade rules drafted by private businesses to ensure fair competition to executive to 
act as its agent, but the law enacted is void because it offered insufficient direc-
tion as to implementation of delegation); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 
(1989) (holding legislature may delegate power to set criminal sentencing guide-
lines to a commission under broad general directives so long as it clearly de-
scribes a general policy, who is to apply it and offers clear limits as to scope of 
delegated authority). 
 133. See cases cited supra note 132; see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 
(1936) (invalidating the statute holding the law penalized those failing to observe 
regulations prescribed by coal producers noting the deficiency in the delegation 
was the conflict of interest created in private entities such that those making the 
rules had interests adverse to those who would be regulated which was a violation 
of due process). 
 134. Barron & Kagan, supra note 81 at 227-28. 
 135. Id. at 201 (referring to the fact Congress may not hand over to a given agency of-
ficial its authority to make policy decisions). 
 136. See generally Field, 143 U.S. at 692 (indicating separation of powers does not bar 
legislature from conferring significant authority on executive); see also J.W. 
Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 405 (holding legislators cannot abdicate consti-
tutionally-granted legislative power entrusted to them, cannot assume constitu-
tionally-granted executive or judicial power and no branch may intrude on the 
province or jurisdiction of any other branch of government). 
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alternative methods to better use, order and structure social relations. The 
endurance and viability of any enacted law, policy, procedure or regulation 
is entirely dependent on the public’s perception of its social utility. 
Chevron deference equates to recognition the legal system is an integral 
and formative partner in a framework governed by separation of powers. 
Chevron deference stands for judicial respect for traditional legislative and 
executive lawmaking and responsible execution of law. Such deference is 
jurisprudential effectuation of the role of courts within a representative 
government. Courts typically refrain from policymaking which is the role of 
legislators. Courts assume, unless there is evidence to indicate otherwise, 
delegates exercise authority responsibly and lawfully.137 Delegates are 
therefore afforded discretion to resolve ambiguity. Interpretive authority in 
the hands of executive decision-makers is crucial for successful effectuation 
of policy choices. Experts must be relied on to make proper decisions138 ac-
cording to their expertise. Courts possess dispositive power over legal con-
struction—that is the power to say what the law is; legislatures possess con-
stitutional authority to make law—that is the power to determine policy. 
The problem with judicial deference in the context of delegated authority is 
the difficulty in ascertaining the proper balance between interpretive, execu-
tive and transformative authority.139 This understanding about how delega-
tion operates does not clarify whether the legislative delegation to the gov-
ernor of Nebraska was lawful—this added knowledge about delegation 
merely raises awareness of how complex the application of law can be.  
VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS, CONFLICT & DELEGATION 
IN NEBRASKA 
 Conflict arises when a branch of government in exercising its constitu-
tionally-granted powers, impacts another branch of government. While sep-
aration of powers clearly distinguishes separate spheres of influence, there 
is almost always, some overlap. For example, the legislative branch is au-
thorized by the constitution to set forth a rule of conduct to determine pub-
lic policy and make law.140 It may lay down conditions or state facts to be 
fulfilled or ascertained, and in this manner legislation is implemented by an 
actor outside the legislature.141 For purposes of discussing delegation in the 
context of separation of powers, the term delegation refers to conferral of 
authority to satisfy or fulfill a directive, not the act of conferral of constitu-
 
 137. Barron & Kagan, supra note 81 at 201-202. 
 138. Id. at 215, 218. 
 139. Id. at 219 (In such cases, transactional analysis breaks down and becomes “situa-
tional rather than logical” or “contingent rather than necessary”). 
 140. Id. at 215. 
 141. In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912. 
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tionally-granted powers by one body of the government to another.142 
The Nebraska State Constitution’s “Language on the Regulation of 
Common Carriers” speaks directly to the structure of governance. Accord-
ing to that pronouncement, unless the legislature enacts some law directed 
specifically to restrict the NSPSC’s authority to retain control over a certain 
class of common carriers for itself, it cannot constitutionally be deprived of 
its original, constitutionally-derived regulatory powers.143 
The question raised by the legislative action in Thompson is whether the 
legislature properly divested the NSPSC of its jurisdiction.144 As the legisla-
ture did not retain regulatory power for itself, and instead delegated the 
power to the governor, the question concerns the constitutionality of the law 
based on delegation of authority to another government branch. 
In Thompson conflict arose among the branches of state government 
when the legislature divested NSPSC of its authority, transferring said au-
thority, along with the legislative taking power, to the executive.145 The 
governor fast-track-approved the pipeline construction route and transferred 
the power to take easements to Keystone, effectively granting a private enti-
ty public condemnation power.146 The delegation thus raised separation of 
powers concerns.147 What complicated matters was the fact, although courts 
generally presume enacted statutes are constitutional, the statute appeared 
flawed (it was quickly written and hastily enacted) and Nebraska’s super-
majority prerequisite for voiding legislation148 failed to check the legisla-
ture. 
The law and economics literature focuses on efficiency of resource allo-
cation to optimize social value. The state is obliged to enhance economic 
efficiency in land use decisions to promote public good. There is a pre-
sumption takings are socially justifiable because government officials are 
held accountable for their actions. What typically occurs is a public official 
declares a need for a taking149 justified by its public-good-promoting pur-
pose, the legislature authorizes an implementation plan and delegates au-
thority to move the plan forward. If there is a challenge to the legitimacy of 
a proposed action, the judiciary reviews procedural steps taken, but defers 
to official action committed in accordance with law. 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. NEB. CONST. art. 4, § 20. 
 144. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 751-52. 
 145. Id. at 739-40. 
 146. NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 21; NEB. CONST. art. 4, § 20; NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-1101 
(2017). 
 147. Singh, Separation of Powers, supra note 20 at 312. 
 148. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2. 
 149. Singh, Separation of Powers, supra note 20 at 314. 
9 FIFTH ARTICLE - JEFFREY KLEEGER TEMPLATED.DOCX  (DO NOT DETETE)  4/12/17  12:03 PM 
78 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development Vol. 6 
State use of takings should be to promote public good. The application of 
takings law in Thompson produced an unintended result of eroding owner-
ship rights150 because the state declared it could route the pipeline and take 
the land of private citizens to do so. It is odd to see conservative property 
owners and environmentalists on the same side of a case, but that is what 
happened in Thompson. Defense of owner rights is possible in the course of 
judicial review because courts possess authority to void legislative acts im-
properly delegating authority to an executive.151 While state action is pre-
sumed legitimate152 in Thompson the owners claimed the legislature unlaw-
fully transferred to the executive regulatory powers reserved to an 
independent agency. The owners asserted the legislative authorization to the 
governor was Kelo-type pretext153 favoring a private company’s interest in 
creating an improvement for its own profit—not primarily to promote pub-
lic good. But the property owners did not prevail in court. 
Why did the delegation and public use arguments fail? The owners 
claimed the statute154 effected dispossession to promote a private corporate 
benefit, the claimed public purpose was speculative, exaggerated155 and il-
lusory and the public purpose claim was in fact a conferral of economic 
benefit on a private entity. Takings of land typically involve a forced ex-
change to generate a surplus, but state and private entities are not supposed 
be the primary beneficiaries of the surplus produced, if any.156 Because the 
power to determine whether an alleged public purpose is sufficiently legit-
imate rests with the public official tasked with implementing an approved 
policy, the only safeguard to ensure against abuse of power by unlawful 
condemnation is active, rigorous, strict-scrutiny judicial review. 
The form and substance of judicial review is typically deferential, with a 
presumption of validity difficult to overcome. In Thompson the court was 
called upon to decide a separation of powers and legitimacy-of-delegation 
matter.157 Corporate shareholders, certain business interests and a number of 
politicians supported the project, while property owners and environmental 
 
 150. See Harrigan, supra note 13 at 227-31.  
 151. Darren Summerville, The Nondelegation Doctrine after Whitman v. American 
Trucking Associations: Constitutional Precedent Breathes a Sigh of Relief, 18 
GA. ST. U.L. REV. 627, 632 (2001).  
 152. Singh, Separation of Powers, supra note 20 at 314. 
 153. Murphy, supra note 19 at 98-100. 
 154. 2012 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1161. 
 155. See Harrigan, supra note 13 at 227-31.  
 156. See RICHARD A, EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY & THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (Harvard Univ. Press, 1985, 1993) (arguing any gain or en-
hanced value from land assembly for development ought not benefit private, rent-
seeking individuals; instead such surplus is a public good belonging to society). 
 157. See Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 751. 
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groups opposed it. The legislature enacted a law to facilitate approval.158 
Potentially impacted landowners challenged the statute claiming the delega-
tion was unlawful.159 A lower court held the statute violated the state consti-
tution because it interfered with a constitutional grant of regulatory jurisdic-
tion.160 The state’s highest court reversed the lower court, but the decision 
was ineffective because it was not binding as only four judges found the 
lower court to be correct.161  
The legal system is established to interpret and apply law to facts. While 
the judicial branch possesses some capacity to protect individuals against 
deprivation of personal and property rights, that capacity is limited by law 
and practical expediency. Review of the facts should lead to equitable re-
sults, but it is the unfortunate pathos of law, when that is not the case. 
Where judicial protection falls short, there is risk state interference with 
private rights may occur to promote a private purpose. This is an example 
of the privatization of law where the state is itself transformed into capital, 
and law is a means to the end of promoting capital accumulation under 
guise of promoting public good, making private gain the equivalent of pub-
lic good.  
Delegation is a tool used by public officials to enhance the efficiency of 
their governance by outsourcing to experts, certain tasks to implement rules 
and policies. Legislators are not experts in the fields they regulate. They 
therefore empower experts to act on their behalf. That was what the com-
mission in Nebraska was established to do. While the legislature could law-
fully retain the power of regulation for itself, it specifically chose to dele-
gate that power to the executive. While the scope and boundaries of the 
delegation were limited, the question in this case is whether the legislature 
could properly delegate to the executive a power already constitutionally-
placed within an independent agency.162 A majority of judges determined 
the delegation was unlawful, but because a supermajority is constitutionally 
required to void a legislative enactment, the statute remained valid.163 
If Thompson had addressed the merits of the case, it likely would have 
declared the legislative delegation unlawful because the transfer of power to 
the governor to facilitate route approval was a delegation of authority the 
 
 158. Legis. B. 1161, 102nd Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Neb 2012). 
 159. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 751 (claiming transfer of authority from NSPSC to the 
governor was an unlawful transfer of legislative taking authority to Keystone 
company); see also Harrigan, supra note 13 at 210 (describing the argument of 
insufficient justification to abrogate owner rights). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 751. 
 162. NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 21. 
 163. See Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 766. 
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legislature did not have. Additionally, the transfer of legislative takings 
power to the governor, who in turn intended to transfer that power to Key-
stone, was also unlawful because private parties cannot exercise govern-
ment power. 
Although delegations are presumed legitimate, such acts must follow es-
tablished procedure and create a definitive record, explaining all the steps 
taken in the decision-making process, to enable a court to determine wheth-
er a public official has exceeded her authority.164 It appears from careful re-
view of Thompson the legislature exceeded its authority when it transferred 
independent agency route approval and legislative takings authority to the 
governor.  
Where authority to delegate power is proper, a fatal problem with some 
aspect of the delegation can occur if there is a clear absence of a policy to 
guide the executive in its decision-making process and exercise of discre-
tion, as occurred in Panama Refining165 and in Schechter.166 To be lawful, a 
delegation must possess an intelligible standard that properly guides the 
delegate in implementation.167 Such a standard may be found in a declara-
tion of policies or statement of purposes sufficiently narrow and specific to 
a particular industry, question or problem.168 If the charge in the delegation 
is vague or if no intelligible standard can be derived, the delegation is defi-
cient.169 
Some theorists argue juridical preference for formality and total specific-
ity of direction can have negative repercussions on delegations, including 
limiting flexibility and increasing transaction costs.170 Constitutionally ade-
quate standards are those that are fair and reasonable, operate in the public 
interest and respond to public necessity or are intended to protect the health, 
safety and welfare of the public.171 Such terms of art are referenced as satis-
factory components, reasonably implicit in a lawful delegation. What seems 
necessary for legitimacy is the delegation provide clear guidance, describe a 
broad policy objective and lend itself to providing a measure of discretion 
in grantees to act such that trusted actors possess necessary and sufficient 
flexibility to adjust to evolving economic, political and social needs, as the 
 
 164. Carter, 298 U.S. at 310. 
 165. Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 405. 
 166. A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 US 495 (where power to formulate codes of 
fair competition for an entire industry was considered too broad a delegation of 
authority). 
 167. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (1989) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 
276 U.S. at 409 (1928)). 
 168. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 541. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Barron & Kagan, supra note 81 at 230-232. 
 171. See supra notes 132-33, 136 and accompanying text. 
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case may be.172 
With respect to setting forth clear standards, proper records must be 
maintained to ensure minimum necessary requirements of notice, hearing 
and findings and considerations of fact are satisfied. This enables for mean-
ingful judicial review. Only with those protections in place would imple-
menting a lower level of judicial review with enhanced deference be appro-
priate. Delegations supported by a fully developed record are more 
trustworthy than delegations lacking in safeguards of notice, hearing, state-
ments, binding orders and consideration supported by facts. 
VII. CONCLUSION—LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 
 Law is described as a means to an end.173 Historically the state has used 
law as a tool to promote order and progress. There are multiple examples of 
state use of force under color of law to establish economic, political or so-
cial change.174 There are connections between economic development and 
public good, but when economic development takings are used to achieve 
those goods, forced dispossession triggers the need to carefully review 
whether rights deprivations are justifiable.175 Takings are excused by the 
claim of necessity, but the authenticity of that claim is questionable when 
takings are used to promote private interests.176 State-authorized condemna-
tion juxtaposes civic duty with social obligation, owner rights with respon-
sibilities and privilege with social liability. The argument developed here is 
the state is pushing the law of takings toward satisfaction of private inter-
ests, which broadens the public use concept. Kelo held economic develop-
ment is a public use.177 In making that claim, the Court stretched the mean-
ing of public use.178 Is public use now the equivalent of private gain? 
Property is creative when facilitating productivity, but is destructive when it 
erodes personal autonomy. 
 Distinctions between social relations and relations of production col-
lapse when the state claims to promote public good by reordering access to 
and permission for use of limited resources. The state achieves legitimacy 
by offering a sound rationale for intervention on owner rights. It claims to 
require fairness and equal treatment under the law, but certain takings do 
not reveal this to be true. Takings were historically about use of state power 
 
 172. Id.; Barron & Kagan, supra note 81 at 214. 
 173. TAMANAHA, supra note 38 at 6-7. 
 174. Examples include taking land for infrastructure development and the civil rights 
movement.  
 175. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 177. Kelo, 545 U.S 469; see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
 178. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
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to impose necessary ends that could not otherwise be achieved through vol-
untary market exchange.179 Condemnation expropriation is a lawful means 
to displace and enclose to accommodate capital accumulation.180 The proof 
this is so is the broadened meaning of public use in the years since Ber-
man.181 
The Keystone litigation moves this process along further because 
Thompson demonstrates court failure and further privatization of law lead-
ing to further privatization of social relations and the state.182 This most re-
cent example of expanding privatization of law demonstrates continued ero-
sion of private rights.183 Should this trend continue, there will be further 
displacements under the neoliberal response to the crisis of capitalism in 
economically predatory regimes.184 The only solution to this problem is to 
maintain a rigorous judicial review of public-private acts and reversal of 
state action that exceeds the proper scope and boundary of lawful authori-
ty.185 One way to minimize the problem of grants of authority in excess of 
what is lawful is to more narrowly draft the terms, conditions and provi-
sions of policies and procedures such that public officials tasked with per-
forming certain duties are limited to the narrow terms of a proper delegation 
granted for a specific purpose and clearly consistent with promoting public 
good. 
 
 
 179. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 18 (detailing the transformation of states’ use 
of the takings clause). 
 180. Farshad Araghi, Accumulation by Displacement: Global Enclosures, Food Crisis, 
and the Ecological Contradictions of Capitalism, 32(1) REV. (FERNAND BRAUDEL 
CTR.) 113-46 (2009). 
 181. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (requiring blight to justify redevelopment 
takings). 
 182. See supra notes 41-61 and accompanying text. 
 183. Murphy, supra note 19 at 111-12. 
 184. Araghi, supra note 180 at 135. 
 185. Murphy, supra note 19 at 108. 
